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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every time I enter a store, I am faced with countless decisions. Most of them are 
trivial, and personal preference or clever marketing determine my choice. But sometimes, 
my decision seems to carry more weight. Most chocolate is made from cacao produced 
by West African child laborers who are often the victims of trafficking or even slavery.1 
Perhaps my purchase of one chocolate bar seems trivial, but if it has been produced with 
the help of slaves, I seem to support a production system that results in serious harm. Of 
course there are other chocolate brands— but they aren’t always available, and usually 
cost more. What harm could this one bar of chocolate really do, anyway? 
This paper argues that we should be ethical consumers— that our consumption 
choices should be based in part on moral reasons. For example, I shall argue that we have 
good reasons to avoid buying chocolate produced with the help of slaves even if no laws 
were violated and it means paying a higher price for comparable items produced by 
workers who were treated well. To some readers this may sound obvious; if I should act 
ethically throughout my life, why would it be permissible to act differently when I choose 
what to buy? As we shall see, the topic merits special attention for a number of reasons.  
1.1 Information 
The first is a point about information, and our duties to be informed citizens. The 
complexity of today’s global economy makes it difficult to be aware of all implications of 
my consumption choices. Those affected by my actions may be far away both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor, “Combating Child 
Labour in Cocoa Growing,” International Labor Organization, February 2005, accessed 20 March 2015. 
www.ilo.org/public//english//standards/ ipec/themes/cocoa/download/2005_02_cl_cocoa.pdf. 
See also Onishi, Norimitsu, “The Bondage of Poverty That Produces Chocolate,” The New York Times, 29 
July 2001, accessed 20 March 2015, www.nytimes.com/2001/07/29/world/the-bondage-of-poverty-that-
produces-chocolate.html. 
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geographically and along the causal chain. It is often unclear— and therefore easy to 
disregard— whether a certain purchase connects me to a production process that results 
in harm to people, animals, or the environment. Being an ethical consumer requires me to 
be reasonably well informed. But just how much does this demand? 
1.2 Motivation 
The second point is one about motivation. Standard economic theory, or at least a 
popular interpretation thereof, advocates something akin to ethical egoism: we ought to 
do what is in our best self-interest. Consumers have no obligations to consider the 
interests of others, it is argued, because in a properly functioning market, individuals each 
acting in their own interest collectively bring about the best outcome.2 Although I argue 
that it is rational to be an ethical consumer and thus to give weight to the interests of 
others in one’s consumption choices, this paper does not offer a comprehensive argument 
against ethical egoism. We always act to satisfy our preferences: if a consumption 
decision weren’t in one’s best interest, all things considered, one would not make it. The 
issue here is not whether or not we act to satisfy our preferences; rather, it is the object of 
our preferences. What I mean by ethical consumption is that the consumer’s preferences 
include at least some of the time a desire to do what is right. 
1.3 Collective action 
 The third point concerns collective action problems, a term that describes 
situations in which sets of individually rational choices lead to overall suboptimal 
outcomes. W.F. Lloyd first discussed what has become known as the “Tragedy of the 
Commons,” using the example of an unfenced common pasture: each person benefits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Adam Smith’s thoughts on the invisible hand of the market: Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1776); The relevant sections can be found in Book IV, chapter 2, paragraph 
9; and Book I, chapter 7. 
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from adding more of her own animals, and yet this individually rational decision leads to 
the depletion of the common resource and is thus to the detriment of all. Such dilemmas 
are difficult to resolve because the desired outcome depends on the cooperation of others, 
but we have no reason to believe that others will in fact cooperate. 
Collectively, individual consumption can lead to serious negative outcomes, and 
we need to examine whether this means that I may sometimes have reasons— or even 
obligations— to avoid such consumption even if I know that (a) my decisions will not 
affect the decisions of others, and (b) that all the ethical consumption decisions I make 
over my lifetime will not make a difference to the overall outcome.  
There are both moral and political solutions to collective action problems but—
largely because we cannot rely on the cooperation of others—political ones are generally 
argued to be the most practical or defensible. Political action has to be taken when relying 
on people’s sense of what is right and wrong is not enough to prevent bad outcomes.  
1.4 Overview of the argument 
I argue that although moral solutions may not be sufficient to prevent harm and 
other bad outcomes caused by consumption, we nonetheless have moral reasons— and at 
times obligations— to avoid consumption that contributes to or otherwise connects us to 
such moral wrongs. In order to defend this position, I will first define ethical 
consumption. Finding the right definition is an important part of the argument, because 
what we consider to be our responsibilities depends on how we define the terms. I then 
show that it is rational to be an ethical consumer because my consumption can be a 
significant contribution to moral wrongs. However, I shall argue that I have good reasons 
	  	  
4	  
to avoid such consumption even when my actions do not seem to matter, because of the 
symbolic or expressive value of such actions. 
This paper will consider three objections to this position. Collectively, they offer a 
relevant objection against the claim advanced here because they each offer a different 
rationale for their common conclusion that it is not the consumer’s but the government’s 
responsibility to solve collective action problems created by consumption.  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that when a collective action problem is so large 
in scale that our actions are insignificant, we cannot call any individual’s action a cause 
of the problem. Because no individual causes the problem, it is strictly the government’s 
job to do something about it.3 
John Broome claims that our duties as individuals differ from those of 
governments because governments are the only actors powerful enough to actually bring 
about change in large-scale collective action problems such as climate change. If 
individuals want to prevent harm or bring about good, there are more efficient ways of 
doing so than by being an ethical consumer.4 
Finally, Mark Sagoff argues that political and economic goals differ in significant 
ways, and that each should be pursued in its respective arena. Because our social and 
political preferences are most appropriately expressed and advanced in the political 
realm, and our consumer preferences most appropriately in the market, we should satisfy 
only our self-regarding preferences in the latter.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “It’s not my fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations,” in 
Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, eds. Stephen M. Gardiner et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
4 John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012). 
5 Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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II. DEFINITION OF ETHICAL CONSUMPTION 
For the purpose of this paper, I define ethical consumption as the consumption of 
goods or services where the decision what to consume is based in part on moral reasons. 
An example would be someone who is opposed to slavery on moral grounds, and who 
subsequently decides not to eat chocolate, or to buy only chocolate from guaranteed 
slavery-free producers. The crucial factor is motivation: to base a consumption decision 
on one’s moral reasons is intended to mean that that no other factor was more important 
than one’s moral reasons. An ethical consumer is therefore someone who bases her 
consumption decisions at least partly on her moral beliefs. 
2.1 Motivation  
It is difficult to discern even one’s own reasons for making a certain choice, and it 
is often quite impossible to discern another’s motivation for doing so. A person usually 
has several reasons for making any given choice— some moral, some non-moral— and it 
may be unclear even to her which one was the main concern. Except perhaps in cases of 
altruistic ethical consumption— such as the purchase of pink ribbons at breast cancer 
fundraising events— we generally have many reasons for buying any given item.6 When 
buying produce, we may consider how fair the farm workers were treated— but also the 
item’s taste, nutritional value, and appearance.  
Kant argued that one can only be sure of an action’s moral worth if it is done from 
duty, and against all other inclinations.7 “The moral worth depends”, he wrote, “[…] not 
on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 And even there we might buy it both because we want to contribute to the cause and because it is a friend 
who is selling them, or because a love interest is watching. 
7 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1993), 398-400. 
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according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has 
been done.”8 If we act consistently with our sense of duty, but it just so happens to be 
aligned with our interests— the fair trade chocolate is also the one that tastes best— it is 
unclear for Kant whether such an action has any moral worth. The outcome is the morally 
preferred one, but this is not sufficient reason to call the person an ethical consumer in 
the way we have defined the term. Perhaps we can describe such consumption as 
ethically differentiated consumption— but we certainly would not give the person an 
award for ethical consumption.  
2.2 Information 
How should we judge someone who makes a consumption decision based on 
moral reasons but incorrect information, so that the action she takes actually contradicts 
her values? I include such cases in my definition of ethical consumption, so long as the 
person was reasonable in believing the information on which she based her decision. 
Suppose that I am concerned about child labor and buy a chocolate bar made from cacao 
that is certified child labor-free; unbeknownst to me, child labor was in fact used in the 
production process. I still practiced ethical consumption as defined above if I was 
reasonable in trusting the certification.  
Ethical consumption thus depends to a certain degree on access to the information 
the consumer needs to make the right choice, and on effort made to find this information. 
But just how informed do we have to be? Should we merely read the labels on the 
products we buy, or are we required to research each product extensively? Not too long 
ago it was quite difficult to find information on the source of any given product, but this 
is not the case today. Advocacy groups and the media regularly inform the public on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 400. 
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issues related to the unethical production of goods, and the Internet has placed almost any 
piece of information at our fingertips.  
It is difficult to determine just how informed consumers ought to be. Perhaps we 
can expect them to be reasonably aware of how the world operates, including under what 
conditions some common items are produced. One would almost have to avoid all news 
channels to be entirely ignorant of such issues. If a person is reasonably informed, certain 
questions will arise. Many consumers do not pursue such questions further; ethical 
consumption requires us to do so. If I come across a news article revealing that much of 
the chocolate consumed worldwide is made from cocoa produced with child labor and 
slavery, I should wonder if the bar of chocolate I plan to buy later on could have been 
produced in such a way.  
Being an ethical consumer therefore requires me to be reasonably aware of the 
circumstances of production of the goods I consume. This means that I must pay attention 
to news stories and make some effort to inform myself if I have any reason to suspect that 
an item was produced under questionable circumstances. 9 The difference between an 
ethical consumer and an ordinary one is the former’s willingness to pay some cost to 
satisfy an other-regarding preference even if she has no other interest or desire in doing 
so. Some of that cost takes the form of time and effort spent on being an informed 
consumer. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This does not mean that I must read every news article published. What is required is simply the kind of 
attention any reasonable citizen ought to pay to the news.  
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III. WHY WE SHOULD STRIVE TO BE ETHICAL CONSUMERS 
Why is it rational to be an ethical consumer, if being one comes at a price that 
may be quite substantial? This paper assumes that human consumption can— and often 
does— result in bad outcomes. The global climate is changing rapidly due to the use of 
fossil fuels and CFC’s; animals are harmed so more people can afford to consume meat 
more cheaply; and humans are enslaved and exploited to produce cheap products for 
others’ consumption.  
In order to see why it is rational to be an ethical consumer, we have to answer a 
number of questions. First, when is a bad outcome morally wrong? Second, when is an 
agent blameworthy for a wrong? And finally, is such blame sufficient reason to require 
an individual to change her consumption habits?  
3.1 When are bad outcomes morally wrong? 
Many of our actions cause harm or other bad outcomes to others, but we do not 
necessarily consider them to be moral wrongs. Perhaps I got the last available parking 
spot when you urgently needed one. The harm this may cause you is not morally wrong 
because neither of us had a prior right to the last parking spot. Some types of harm do not 
constitute moral wrongs because they are reciprocated. For example, every car driver 
imposes serious risks on those around her. While we generally consider the imposition of 
serious risk on others to be morally wrong, this is not the case here because each driver 
imposes more or less the same risk on all others. 
3.2 Blameworthiness 
Of course, some bad outcomes really are morally wrong. This could be the case 
because an agent violated her duty, or because a patient’s rights were violated. But even 
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when an outcome is wrong we do not always blame the agent who brought it about. 
Inflicting pain on others is clearly wrong, but we are less willing to find the culprit 
blameworthy if it is a cat, or a young child.  
There are certain prerequisites for being even potentially blameworthy— among 
them the capacity to reason, to reflect on one’s actions and to consciously choose 
between various possible actions.10 Since some agents (such as young children or cats) 
don’t have these capacities, we do not consider them to possess moral agency, and thus 
exclude them from considerations of blame. These agents may be causally responsible for 
a bad outcome, but we do not blame them for it in any moral sense.  
But even moral agents may at times not be blameworthy for wrongs they commit. 
Someone who could not act differently, for example, is not deserving of blame despite 
her causal responsibility.11 We do not believe a person is blameworthy for harming 
another if she was forced at gunpoint to do so. And even if I can choose freely my 
blameworthiness may be diminished if my choice was based on false or insufficient 
information. If an agent is unaware of the wrongness of an action and cannot reasonably 
be expected to be aware of it, she cannot be deserving of blame. For example, while I 
may be blameworthy for knowingly buying chocolate produced by slaves, I cannot be 
blamed if I did not know about the circumstances of production, and could not have 
reasonably been expected to be aware of them. 
3.3 Can consumers be blameworthy? 
Some argue that the harm in which our consumption results, or to which it 
contributes, is somehow justified by the usualness of such consumption. If it is common 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Neal Tognazzini and D. Justin Coates, "Blame," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last 
modified 1 May 2014, accessed 20 March 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/blame/.  
11 Ibid. 
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to use gasoline and to buy the most affordable shirt regardless of how it was made, is the 
harm such consumption contributes to not somehow mitigated by societal factors? I argue 
that it is not. Even if everyone around me owned slaves it would be morally wrong for me 
to buy a slave myself: the harm done by slavery would in no way be diminished by being 
culturally accepted. Similarly, the wrongs to which my consumer choices may contribute 
are not justified by societal norms regarding what type of consumption is acceptable. 
Perhaps usualness diminishes the blame we deserve if it prevents us from recognizing the 
wrongness of the act; but it does not diminish the wrongness itself. 
 3.3.1 Justifiable harm 
Of course, harm caused by necessary consumption may be justifiable. An 
ambulance needs gasoline,12 and its benefits clearly outweigh the harm done by its 
emissions. Moreover, a desperately poor person generally does not, and perhaps should 
not, worry about whether her shirt came from fairly paid workers, or if her food was 
produced locally. Harm that is necessarily caused in the process of meeting basic needs is 
justified because not to meet such needs would be to harm oneself.13 If the only available 
clothing was produced in sweatshops, the harm in which my consumption may implicate 
me has to be accepted. However, most of our consumption does more than simply meet 
such basic needs. It often fulfills desires and wants more than necessities. When this is 
the case, it is more difficult to argue that the harms we cause by our consumption are 
justified.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 At least as long as there is no viable alternative source of fuel. 
13 Of course we can think of situations where it may not: what about a person who feels a “basic need” to 
kill or torture others? But I am speaking of a person with average basic needs- food, clothing, shelter, and 
the like. 
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Assuming that there are alternatives, or that we do not strictly need the item we 
are about to purchase, it seems that we can avoid harming others without sacrificing 
anything of moral significance ourselves. Most cacao production today is based on the 
exploitation of child workers. But to avoid contributing to this system of production does 
not mean that I have to give up chocolate: there are many producers to choose from, quite 
a few of whom do not rely on child labor and ensure fair compensation of all workers. I 
may have to pay a little more for an ethically produced bar of chocolate, but this does not 
justify the purchase of its non-ethical substitute.  
 3.3.2 Causation 
Some consumption directly results in harm or other wrongs. Buying a slave with 
the intention to keep her in slavery is an obvious example: even if it were legal we would 
have strong moral obligations not to do it. If an action directly results in a serious wrong, 
we generally have an obligation to avoid it; this rule applies to our consumption as much 
as it does to all other aspects of life.  
However, our consumption generally does not result in serious wrongs quite as 
directly. The causal connection between our consumption and a wrong is often obscured 
by its complexity, or by the fact that our consumption contributes to a collective harm 
rather than causing harm individually. Moreover, many of our contributions seem 
negligible. All these points must be seriously considered if we are to show that it is 
rational to pay more for an ethically differentiated product.  
Let us first examine contributions to collective harm. The emissions of my car, for 
example, may not be sufficiently harmful to cause respiratory problems for a pedestrian 
who crosses the street behind me, and even if I had not used my car on this particular day 
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it is likely that there would have been enough other drivers to collectively generate 
harmful levels of pollution. My contribution was thus neither sufficient nor necessary for 
the harm to occur. However, my driving still contributes to this pollution and the harm 
that results. 
Some argue that an agent is not to blame for her contribution to harm if it would 
have occurred regardless of her contribution. For example, it is often argued that 
individuals do not deserve blame for global climate change because it would occur 
regardless of anyone’s individual contribution. Derek Parfit calls this kind of reasoning a 
mistake in moral mathematics. He argues that it is wrong to consider only the effects of 
single acts rather than the overall outcome: “Even if each of us harms no one,” he writes, 
“we can be acting wrongly if we together harm other people.”14 If harm results, a 
plausible moral theory must allow us to identify the causal agent and assign responsibility 
and blame, if appropriate.  
The causal connection between an act of consumption and the harm that results 
from it may also be obscured either by the distance in time or space which separates 
agent and patient, or by the complexity of their economic relationship. The emissions of 
my car may not cause harm to those around me, but members of future generations and 
citizens of distant countries may suffer the consequences. Moreover, we do not 
personally interact with the producers of most of the items we consume. It is easy to be 
unaware of or ignore the circumstances of their production: not only the hand of the 
market is invisible, but also the hands producing most of the goods we consume. But 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 70. 
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distance does not diminish our moral obligations: harm is harm, no matter where or when 
it occurs.15 
How can we blame someone if it is unclear that she has actually contributed to the 
harm, either because of overdetermination or the obscurity of the causal relationship? We 
blame murderous dictators, but also their secretaries and bureaucrats—but on what 
grounds? Many collective action problems are so complex that it is difficult to establish 
with any degree of precision whose contribution caused how much harm. However, 
causal connection to bad outcomes is not the only thing that matters to the morality of our 
actions. Indeed, mere association with an entity that causes significant harm can at times 
be sufficient ground for blame. 
We blame the regime bureaucrat because she seems to support and associate 
herself with a system that results in harm: she is an accomplice to it. The concept of 
complicity allows us to distinguish between different levels of involvement in a collective 
effort, and subsequently ascribe different levels of culpability for the bad outcome.16 The 
dictator may receive a large portion of the blame, but the bureaucrat deserves some as 
well.  
While complex relationships may obscure or dilute causal connections, an 
understanding of complicity allows us to recognize blameworthiness even when no 
causal connection can be established. Even if it is unclear how my purchase of a shirt 
produced in a sweatshop links me causally to the exploitation of workers, my purchase 
and the benefit I draw from the product make me complicit in this exploitation. But 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229-40. 
16 Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 157-158. 
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complicity is not always sufficient grounds for blame: the intentions of the agent, and her 
awareness of the wrong in which her action implicates her, also matter to our judgment. 
3.3.3 Intent and Information 
 We assign more blame to agents who intentionally cause harm to others than to 
those who do so unintentionally. Consumers generally do not intend their behavior to 
contribute to moral wrongs. Although we may know that most textiles are produced by 
underpaid seamstresses working in unsafe conditions, we do not buy shirts hoping to 
contribute to this reality. Schwartz argues that what matters here is our awareness of the 
injustice: if I buy a morally tainted product despite my awareness of the wrongs 
connected to its production, my participation in the collective wrongdoing can properly 
be called intentional.17 We cannot claim that we did not intend to contribute to a wrong if 
we were aware that our action would do so. If we know— or could easily know— about 
the wrongs connected to a consumer good and either ignore these facts, or accept the 
outcome as unfortunate and unintended, but necessary, we become intentional 
accomplices.  
 The necessary information may not always be easily available, so that we do not 
always know which products will make us complicit in collective wrongdoing, and which 
won’t. However, this does not mean that we can simply ignore the potential bad outcome 
altogether. In his defense of vegetarianism, Peter Singer argues that when we cannot 
determine which meat comes from humanely treated animals, and which from animals 
subjected to significant suffering during their lifespan— as may be the case in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 David Schwartz, Consuming Choices: Ethics in a Global Consumer Age (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2010), 80. 
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supermarket— we should avoid consuming meat altogether.18 Singer’s argument for 
vegetarianism can easily be applied to other types of consumption: if we cannot 
determine which items of clothing at a department store were produced without causing 
harm or other moral wrongs, we should not buy any of them. To choose one that may be 
morally tainted, to use Schwartz’s term, would be to support a system that results in 
harm. 
3.3.4 Negligible risks and contributions 
Of course, the situation is never quite as simple. Suppose that only 5% of the 
goods in a store are morally tainted, and the remaining 95% are not. It seems excessive to 
claim that we should avoid the store altogether. But where would we draw the line? At a 
thirty percent chance of contributing to a wrong? Fifty? The choice would be arbitrary, 
and yet it seems that Singer’s dictum is too strict.  
Parfit seems to argue, with Singer, that when the potential wrong is very serious, 
we cannot ignore even the smallest chance— especially when such small chances are 
taken many times over. The chance of contributing to a wrong increases if I shop daily at 
a store where some items are morally tainted. Moreover, if many of us take small chances 
many times each day, the risk of bringing about serious harm suddenly becomes much 
greater.  
Individual contributions to climate change are a good example of such a situation. 
My driving has a miniscule chance of making matters worse, but the potential harm is 
very serious indeed: human lives are lost, and many more will be lost over the coming 
decades. Moreover, I drive regularly, and many others do, too. However small each 
chance may seem, it is repeated countless times, and the potential outcome is very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011), 56. 
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serious. According to Parfit, even the smallest emission must therefore be taken 
seriously, because “[the] large numbers roughly cancel out the smallness of the 
chance.”19, 20 
However, some may challenge the claim that even the smallest of contributions 
must be taken very seriously. Surely individual contributions matter, but do the emissions 
of my lawnmower constitute a morally significant contribution to climate change? Harm 
exists on a continuum, and at some point it ceases to be morally significant. Although I 
will offer no argument about where on the continuum this point may lie, for this paper we 
must simply assume that at some point it does. The question is whether we still have an 
obligation to avoid contributions to harm if they are negligible. I argue that we do, though 
such an obligation must certainly be less than the one we have not to make a large 
contribution to harm. However, even negligible contributions to harm can connect us to 
moral wrongs in ways that give us good reason to avoid them, because efficiency is not 
the only factor determining the morality of our actions. 
3.4 Symbolic and expressive value 
One reason why our actions should not be guided by considerations of efficiency 
alone is their potential symbolic or expressive value. Thomas Hill makes this point when 
he argues that we sometimes feel the need to act in a certain way regardless of the results 
of our action, as in the case of symbolic protest. A person living under an oppressive 
dictatorship may know that her protest will not make a difference, but still feel moved to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 75. 
20 One way to look at this is to say that if my action has a 10% chance of seriously harming ten people, it is 
the same as if I had actually harmed one person. Similarly, if I make one millionth of a contribution to a 
collective action that harms one million people, I am just as blameworthy as if I had actually harmed one 
person. It is because climate change causes such serious harm that each contribution- even very small ones- 
matter. Yet another way to look at such problems is to consider each contribution to a wrong as the cause of 
a small harm: each CO2 molecule emitted warms the atmosphere by a small amount; each shirt made in a 
sweatshop exploits a seamstress just a little more. 
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protest because she just can’t bear not to do anything.21 Similarly, I may know that my 
purchase of a fair trade chocolate bar will not prevent any harm, but still feel the need to 
avoid its morally tainted alternatives because I do not want to associate myself with a 
system of production that results in harm. 
Hill argues that if a person finds herself to be a member of a group so deeply 
immoral that it is beyond reform, dissociation from the group may be the only option 
left.22 While we cannot quite claim that to be a consumer is to automatically belong to a 
deeply immoral group, some parallels are clear. Many patterns of production and 
consumption result in bad outcomes. This is so common, and the patterns so deeply 
entrenched in today’s economic system and culture, that it would be almost impossible 
for an individual to change them. The only alternative to complicity some consumers see 
may therefore be to dissociate themselves from what they consider to be a deeply 
immoral system of production and consumption.23 
Total dissociation from patterns of production that result in moral wrongs is not a 
realistic or desirable option for most of us. However, we have good moral reasons to 
dissociate whenever possible from those forms of consumption that result in moral 
wrongs or make us accomplices to such wrongs. Even when my consumption does not 
directly cause the wrong and my boycott does not prevent it, I may still want to have as 
little to do with it as possible—as an expression of the value I place on justice, or the 
deep frustration at my inability to change the collective outcome. 24 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Thomas Hill, “Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 9, no. 1 (1979): 
88. 
22 Ibid., 90.  
23 Or at least from certain industries. 
24 Ibid., 97. 
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IV. OBJECTIONS 
Let us now turn to several objections to the position defended in the previous 
sections. Arguments could be made against ethical consumption on a variety of grounds, 
but I will focus on one central challenge to my position— namely, that it is not the 
responsibility of individuals to pursue moral goals in consumer decisions. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, John Broome, and Mark Sagoff— the three authors considered in the 
following section— all make this point, though each offers a different argument for it.  
4.1 Sinnott-Armstrong 
In “It’s not my fault,” Sinnott-Armstrong claims that he, too, has the intuition that 
individuals have a responsibility to change their consumption behavior when it 
contributes to collective harm. However, he argues that there is no theoretical support for 
this position. His argument focuses on the example of an SUV joyride on a Sunday 
afternoon, carried out for no reason other than personal enjoyment. What could be wrong 
with such a joyride, he asks? He accepts that the burning of fossil fuels is the main cause 
of global warming, and yet he concludes that we have no individual obligation to boycott 
fossil fuels. His argument is based on the claim that in the case of massive collective 
action problems such as climate change, we cannot truly say that an individual actually 
causes any harm, since her actions are neither sufficient nor necessary to cause it. Instead, 
he claims that it is the responsibility of governments to fight global warming because 
they can make a difference. The moral obligation of individuals in this case is to get the 
government to act on its responsibility.25 
I will now examine some of the claims and assumptions Sinnott-Armstrong 
makes, and show why they are mistaken. I do not argue here against his final conclusion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Sinnott-Armstrong, “It’s Not My Fault,” 343-44. 
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regarding the moral obligations of individuals to get their governments to act on their 
duties. Rather, I will argue against his claim that individual contributions to large-scale 
collective harms such as climate change do not matter.  
Sinnott-Armstrong points out that an individual’s car use is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for climate change to occur: one driver cannot cause it alone, and climate 
change would occur even if he did not drive his SUV. But it is unclear why we must 
establish whether one’s actions are sufficient and necessary for harm to occur in 
situations where they clearly contribute to such harm. Granted, no individual is the sole 
source of climate change— but individuals clearly contribute to it. Sinnott-Armstrong 
contends that there are special circumstances when one should be held responsible 
regardless of the sufficiency or necessity of one’s actions to the harm done. He gives the 
example of someone who helps a group of people push a car off a cliff. He could not 
have done it by himself, and the group is quite capable of doing it without additional 
help. Nonetheless, he joins in. Here, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, the person should be seen 
as a cause of harm because of his intent and the unusual nature of the act.  
However, the intent of the person in his example does not matter to questions of 
causation. Perhaps he could not care less whether the car goes over the cliff, and his 
concern is merely to fit in with the group that is pushing the vehicle. We may question 
the person’s choice of friends, but his intent to cause harm (or lack thereof) clearly 
doesn’t affect causation.26 If I shoot a gun at a building I need not intend to harm 
someone to be held responsible if the bullet does hit a person. We have already seen in an 
earlier section that actual intent is not even necessary for an actor to be blameworthy for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Though it may of course affect the agent’s blameworthiness. 
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harm she causes so long as she was, or should have been, aware of the negative 
consequences of her act.  
Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim about the impact of the usualness of an act on its 
moral worth is quite interesting. Section 3.3 discussed the topic at some length, but it is 
worth reiterating because of the seriousness of this challenge. Many patterns of 
consumption common today may be considered harmful or otherwise damaging: the use 
of fossil fuels contributes to climate change; excessive water use depletes aquifers; and 
the purchase of cheap commodity goods supports exploitative industries. But this is how 
our society works— almost everyone consumes in these or similar ways. Can I really be 
held responsible for the pollution from my car if so many others drive cars as well? 
However, what a society considers to be acceptable behavior does not always appear to 
be moral, at least in hindsight. There was a time when slavery was common in some parts 
of the US, and yet I suspect that Sinnott-Armstrong would not claim that it had been 
morally permissible for a person living at that time to engage in the practice simply 
because it was not unusual.  
As I stated earlier, the usualness of an act may be an exculpating factor with 
respect to the agent’s blameworthiness because social norms can prevent us from 
recognizing what is morally right. Raised in a society where slavery is the norm, we may 
never question the morality of buying another human being. It does not, however, affect 
the wrongness of the act, let alone the causal relationship between our actions and the 
harm that results. 
An argument for ethical consumption can seem rather moralistic if the activity 
concerned is not unusual. It seems too strict to require everyone to stop driving a car to 
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work because cars are currently necessary for the functioning of our society. But Sinnott-
Armstrong’s example of a person who drives an SUV around the countryside for fun is a 
situation with different moral implications. While the average car driver may not be 
morally responsible for her contribution to the harm that results if she needs a car to live 
well, this necessity is not given in the case of someone who takes a gas-guzzling vehicle 
out for joyrides just to feel the wind in his hair.  
Sinnott-Armstrong further claims that we cannot call a person responsible for 
harm if we cannot trace that harm back to a certain action she performed. He argues that 
we cannot truthfully say that his own driving is a cause of global warming if no storms, 
floods or droughts can be traced back to the specific molecules his SUV emitted. Sinnott-
Armstrong’s point is not that he causes insignificant harms: “Instead, the point is simply 
that my individual joy ride does not cause global warming, climate change, or any of 
their resulting harms […].”27 
In most cases it is clearly impossible— or at the very least impractical— to 
determine the specific instance or amount of harm caused by a certain act of 
consumption. Sinnott-Armstrong is right, though trivially so, to point out that it is 
impossible to link any natural disaster to his SUV joyride. However, our inability to 
determine who contributed to which natural disaster is simply a fact about how climate 
change works. It does not diminish our responsibility for the harm to which we 
contribute. Moreover, as discussed above, direct causation of the “sufficient-and-
necessary” type is not the only reason why one might be blameworthy for harm. We can 
also distinguish causation through aggregation, and a connection to causation through 
complicity.  	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Our contributions may not make a noticeable difference to climate change, but 
each of us contributes substantially to the harm in which it results, in the sense that all of 
us contribute more or less equally.28 If all of us contribute equally and the aggregate 
outcome is wrong, then each contribution may be equally wrong. No individual causes 
climate change alone, but this surely does not mean that humans do not cause climate 
change. It simply is not caused by anyone individually. If we accept this view, Sinnott-
Armstrong’s joy rider may in fact be especially blameworthy, given that he most likely 
already contributes more than the average human being.29 His SUV joyride would 
increase his contribution even further.  
Another way one can be blameworthy for harm is by being an accomplice, for 
example by supporting an institution or system that harms others. Here, too, an 
individual’s actions are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause harm directly, but they 
seem to contribute to harm through a mediating institution. Perhaps it is misleading to 
call complicity itself a form of causation, but it certainly connects the agent to the cause 
of harm in a morally significant way. Few bureaucrats in a dictatorship act in ways that 
are sufficient and necessary for atrocities to occur. And yet we find them blameworthy 
for their contribution to and compliance with a system that resulted in such harm. 
As we have seen, Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments against the responsibility of 
individual agents in situations of collective harm do not withstand closer examination 
because his argument is based on a mistaken concept of causation. He claims that 
individuals cannot truthfully be said to cause climate change, and thus falsely concludes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Most of us certainly contribute on the same order of magnitude. 
29 In 2011, the average American emitted more than three times as much CO2 as the average world citizen 
(17.3 tons and 4.9 tons, respectively). See: Joint Research Centre and Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency, “Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research”, release version 4.2, European 
Commission, 2011, http://edgar.jrc.ec.europe.eu. 
	  	  
23	  
that they cannot be held responsible for the harm that results. However, there are different 
types of causation, so that even an action that is neither sufficient nor necessary for harm 
to occur may be cause for blame.30  
4.2 John Broome 
In Climate Matters, Broome argues that although individuals do contribute to 
climate change, it is the government’s responsibility to tackle the problem. While 
Sinnott-Armstrong denies that individual contributions can truthfully be called a cause of 
climate change, Broome readily agrees that individual emissions contribute causally to 
this problem that, in the long run, results in serious harm. He argues that we need to 
either stop acting in ways that contribute to such harm, or compensate our victims. 
Compensation is a more efficient use of resources, he claims, so that we should 
compensate the victims of climate change rather than incur large costs to prevent our 
individual emissions. However, he concludes that it is only governments who should 
tackle the problem of climate change itself, because only they have the necessary 
resources at their disposal. 
Broome argues that an individual’s contribution to climate change is unjust 
because it meets a number of conditions. First, ours is an active and knowing contribution 
to serious harm. Our emissions are no accident, and we know of their eventual impact, 
which includes the loss of human lives. Moreover, we act to our own benefit and without 
compensating our victims. And finally, most of the harm caused by our emissions is not 
reciprocated.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Sinnott-Armstrong’s claims that governments have the responsibility to intervene in such situations, and 
that individuals have a responsibility to make their governments do so, may yet be valid. Unfortunately, a 
discussion of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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We can differentiate reciprocity temporally and geographically. Concerning the 
former, we should note that today’s emissions will harm future generations, while the 
emissions of future generations will not harm those currently alive.31 But even today, the 
citizens of some countries cause more emissions than others: in 2011, the average US-
American caused 17.3 tons of CO2 emissions, while the average citizen of Burundi 
caused only 0.009 tons.32 So while some emissions seem to be globally reciprocated, 
most of those caused by developed countries are certainly not. Moreover, changing 
climate patterns and more extreme weather events hurt the poor more than the rich.  
Broome concludes that we therefore have a duty to either prevent our emissions 
or compensate our victims. But as he points out, prevention would come at great cost. He 
estimates that all emissions caused by a person living in a developed country over her 
lifetime shorten one statistical life by six months.33 Broome finds this to be substantial, 
but preventing such harm seems to require a complete change of lifestyle. Doing so 
would extend a statistical life by six months at a very high cost, while one can save one 
real life, and thus presumably extend it by much more than six months, at a cost of a few 
hundred dollars— for example by supporting relatively simple medical procedures in 
developing countries.34 Broome concludes that our actions should therefore be guided by 
considerations of efficiency. While I have no duty to reduce my emissions except where I 
can do so at little cost to myself,35 I should use my money36 where it has the greatest 
impact on the welfare of others.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 While this raises many important questions, it is not the focus of this paper. 
32 See Joint Research Centre, Emission Database.  
33 Broome, Climate Matters, 65. 
34 Ibid., 66. 
35 Ibid. He writes that “Your duty of goodness requires you to switch off lights when you do not need them, 
and choose vegetarian options more often, but nothing much more onerous than that.” 
36 Or at least a portion of it, depending on the amount of harm I contribute to. 
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We can respond to Broome’s claims in two ways. One is to argue that my 
individual actions contribute to a solution in a way that is morally significant, even if they 
do not prevent or even noticeably reduce the harms caused by climate change. Broome is 
correct to point out the apparent inefficacy of our actions, but he neglects to mention that 
the same is true for the opposite course of action: even if I devoted all my resources to 
causing climate change, I would not make a noticeable difference. Broome essentially 
attempts to make a point quite similar to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument that his 
emissions are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause climate change. Likewise, my 
actions aimed at preventing climate change might not be necessary or sufficient to do so. 
However, just as Broome argues that my contributions to climate change are morally 
significant, we must conclude that my contribution to a solution of such collective action 
problems matters as well. 
Moreover, my actions can have an impact on the behavior of others, and perhaps 
enough of an impact on enough others to begin to make a measurable difference. 
Activists, journalists and similar public figures use their influence to change the way 
others act, and there are sufficient examples of one person having a significant impact on 
social or environmental issues. Rosa Parks may not have ended segregation in the 
American South, but few would argue that her actions made no difference. Broome also 
seems to underestimate the influence our actions can have on those close to us. As 
Schwartz puts it, the largest benefit of my ethical consumption may not result from the 
direct prevention of harm, but from those around me knowing (or believing) that I acted 
in a certain way.37 Morality is contagious: just as my self-interested consumption can 
encourage others to act or continue acting likewise, ethical consumption encourages those 	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around me to follow suit. While the difference my individual act makes may be modest, it 
is a difference that is no less morally relevant for its limited scope. 
A second response to Broome’s claim that my individual actions aimed at slowing 
climate change do not make a difference, or at least not the most effective difference, is 
to point out that it isn’t clear why that should affect their moral worth. An action’s moral 
worth does not just depend on its consequences, and surely our beliefs about the morality 
of an action should not be guided by considerations of efficiency alone.38 Broome is 
correct to point out that I could bring about good more efficiently by putting my 
resources to other uses, but this is not sufficient reason to say that I don’t have the 
responsibility to reduce my contribution to climate change.  
One reason for this is that a supposed cancelling of harm by doing good elsewhere 
does not seem to completely eliminate the blame we deserve for causing harm in the first 
place. Any compensation I could offer would be unlikely to actually benefit those 
individuals I have harmed, if there are any particular individuals harmed by my 
emissions. For example, several small island states in the Pacific face submersion by 
rising ocean levels. Their inhabitants will soon be climate refugees, and all polluters are, 
to some degree, to blame for this harm. Broome argues that my purchase of carbon 
offsets would cancel out my share of the blame, but the Pacific islanders have still lost 
their homes. Perhaps they will receive monetary compensation through a climate fund of 
sorts, but my purchase of carbon offsets does nothing to compensate them for the harm 
they suffer.39 Although a cost-benefit analysis may appear to show that all harm was 
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39 To say nothing about the sorts of harms that cannot be compensated monetarily.  
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cancelled out, it seems that I still caused uncompensated harm, even if another polluter 
eventually compensates my victims.  
Another reason why our actions should not be guided by considerations of 
efficiency alone is the potential symbolic value of our actions. As mentioned before, an 
action can derive value not only from the good it produces, but also from its expressive or 
symbolic function. If Broome were correct in his prioritization of efficiency, we should 
not find moral value in the symbolic protest of a citizen of a repressive regime who 
knows that her actions will not make a difference. But we find symbolic protest 
praiseworthy, and perhaps even criticize those who do not protest. Given the magnitude 
of climate change, Broome may be correct to point out that the actions of one individual 
do not make a difference, but our beliefs about the moral worth of certain actions are not, 
and should not be, guided by considerations of efficiency alone. It may not be possible or 
practical to prevent all contributions to such harm by dissociating oneself from the 
economic system that results in climate change. However, as Hill writes, “a more limited 
disassociation in special contexts is often regarded as morally appropriate and even 
commendable,” if only because it serves as a symbol of our discontent with the harm 
done, and our inability to prevent it.40 
Broome concludes that it is governments who need to address the harm caused by 
climate change because they “control more resources [and] have the means of controlling 
the resources of all the individuals who make up their public.”41 Although this paper does 
not focus on the responsibilities of governments, it is here sufficient to note that 
Broome’s challenge to individual responsibilities in situations of collective harm was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Hill, “Symbolic Protest,” 90. 
41 Broome, Climate Matters, 66. 
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successful. Individuals can indeed make a difference by influencing those around them. 
But I have also argued that even if it were true that individual actions did not make a 
difference, efficiency should not be the sole guiding factor in determining the moral 
worth of an action. Considerations of efficiency carry weight in ethical debates, but 
unless we presuppose a radical and rather strict consequentialist framework, they are 
certainly not the only factor we should have in mind when determining what to do.  
4.3 Mark Sagoff 
The two objections we have discussed so far focused on questions of causation 
and efficiency. Sinnott-Armstrong and Broome take different stances, but both agree that 
it is the government’s responsibility to take action when individual behavior leads to 
collective harm. Let us now consider an objection by Mark Sagoff, who makes a very 
different argument against ascribing the responsibility for collective harms to individual 
consumers.  
In The Economy of the Earth, Sagoff argues that not all choices can be understood 
in economic terms. I may vote in favor of higher taxes, for example, and yet try to pay as 
little as possible when the time comes to file my own taxes. How are we to interpret such 
seemingly conflicting behavior? Sagoff argues that we have different preferences as 
individuals and as citizens. As individuals, we act in our best self-interest; as citizens, we 
pursue larger social and political ideals. It makes sense to vote for higher taxes while 
simultaneously trying to avoid paying more taxes than one has to, because these two 
actions take place in different realms— one public, the other private— where different 
preferences are satisfied and expressed.  
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In fact, Broome makes a similar point when he writes that there are two 
democratic mechanisms: the market, and the standard political processes of public debate 
and voting.42 Concern for future generations can be expressed in either: I could save 
money for my descendants, or I could vote in favor of certain policies that will support 
them. Broome argues that saving is not the best way to ensure their wellbeing because the 
market is volatile. Instead, the proper democratic mechanism to support future 
generations is that of public deliberation and voting.  
Sagoff argues similarly that it is quite acceptable to be a narrowly self-interested 
consumer, because social and political questions are more properly addressed in the 
political arena rather than the market. However, his argument ultimately falls short for 
two reasons. Firstly, he makes too strong a distinction between the public and the private. 
Secondly, he does not seem to account for the special problems posed by a globalized 
economy.  
Let us first consider his views on public and private preferences. Sagoff writes 
that “as consumers, we act to acquire what we want for ourselves individually […]. As 
citizens, however, we act through and on behalf of social institutions.”43 But when are we 
citizens, and when consumers? Surely we care about moral issues even after entering a 
supermarket, and few of us are entirely selfless in their voting behavior.  
James Buchanan argued that such an assumption about fundamentally different 
motivations underlying our market behavior and political actions would mean that “man 
must be assumed to shift his psychological and moral gears when he moves from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Broome, Climate Matters, 143. 
43 Sagoff, Economy of the Earth, 31. 
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realm of organized market activity to that of organized political activity and vice versa.”44 
The issue is not as clear-cut as Sagoff makes it out to be, and we may wonder, with 
Buchanan, what it is that supposedly triggers the shift of our psychological and moral 
gears when we move from one realm to another. 
 There are countless examples of consumers who do not simply act to acquire what 
they want for themselves. Of course, one may argue that some consumers simply want 
Fair-Trade chocolate or solar power. But this seems to be a rather trivial understanding of 
ethical consumption. At times, consumers even state their motivations for making certain 
purchases, and whole websites and magazines are published that aim to help consumers 
make more ethical consumption decisions by rating companies or products according to 
their supposed adherence to ethical standards.  
We are never just consumers or citizens— our values shape the wants we have 
and influence what we buy. A person whose religion forbids the consumption of pork 
does not buy pork products, and someone who enjoys smoking may oppose legislation 
that would ban smoking in public areas. Sagoff argues, with Kant, that a person is not 
merely a haver of wants, but rather a judge of values.45 But a person always fulfills both 
roles, and it is impossible to separate the two. 
 Sagoff’s argument has a second flaw: it does not account for the special 
complications presented by today’s globalized economy. Individuals generally do not 
have the opportunity to advance their social goals in the international political sphere: 
international treaties are not voted on directly by the citizens of any country. While 
deliberative democracy as Sagoff envisions it is hardly achievable on a national scale, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 James Buchanan, “Politics, Policy and the Pigovian Margins,” Economica, New Series 29, no. 113 
(1962): 23-4. 
45 Sagoff, Economy of the Earth, 40. 
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seems completely impossible on an international one. There are simply too many 
individuals, separated by geographical and linguistic barriers, to allow for the kind of 
open discourse Sagoff appears to imagine.  
Perhaps more importantly, we do not seem to perceive distant others as citizens of 
the same political unit. Sagoff argues that “consumers who have to pay higher prices as a 
result may nevertheless favor safety regulations in the workplace as a matter of national 
pride and collective self-respect, not self-interest.”46 But it is unclear whether this is the 
case on an international level. While the existence of international human rights 
campaigns and similar political initiatives seems to give some support to his view, the 
reality is that few countries sign international treaties that would hurt them economically, 
regardless of whether they are morally desirable or not. Our current lack of a binding 
international climate treaty serves as an example.  
Sagoff’s model thus fails first of all on a descriptive level: consumers do buy 
according to some of their values, not least because their wants are shaped by their values 
and beliefs. But it also fails on a normative level. It may be necessary and most 
appropriate to discuss and promote ideals such as equality and freedom in the political 
arena, but this does not mean that an individual, in her role as a consumer, is not subject 
to any moral obligations. Considering that we are never just havers of wants or judges of 
values, but always complex individuals whose values and wants are inextricable from one 
another, it may in fact be most appropriate for individuals to attempt to further their 
social goals and express their values through their consumption as well. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Where does this leave us? Corporations have duties not to cause harm, but their 
duties have limits. What is more, perhaps we cannot expect profit-driven corporations to 
adhere to the highest ethical standards at all times. Governments have certain duties as 
well, and some problems really can be solved most effectively through government 
action. For example, governments can enforce legislation that changes the incentive 
structure for other actors in such a way that it is most rational for them to adhere to high 
ethical standards.  
However, we cannot rely on governments alone to ensure the morally ideal 
outcome, or the ethical behavior of individual agents. Government action is often too 
blunt an instrument, and excessive government intervention runs counter to many of our 
most basic assumptions of how a democratic society should function. We do not want the 
government to intervene in the choices parents make for their children unless the parents 
endanger the child’s welfare. Similarly, we generally do not want the government to 
dictate what items we can buy at the store. 
This paper has focused on the responsibilities of individuals, and I have argued 
that individuals have certain obligations to ensure that their consumer choices do not 
cause unjust harm to others. One fundamental requirement of ethical consumption is 
awareness: consumers need to be reasonably informed about the moral implications of 
the goods they consume. It is impossible to determine any specific level of awareness we 
can require of all consumers. But perhaps, as I have argued, we can require them to be 
generally aware of the conditions under which commonplace items are produced, or the 
harms to which certain kinds of consumption contribute. Media outlets report regularly 
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on the unfair treatment of workers and environmental damage caused by various 
industries. In 2012, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice sentenced a North 
Carolina hog farm to pay $1.5 million for discharging animal waste into the Waccamaw 
River, polluting the waterway and endangering fragile wetlands.47 The case gained 
notoriety, and the state’s hog industry came under great public scrutiny. We could 
certainly expect the average North Carolinian consumer to be aware of some of the 
environmental risk posed by large feedlot operations.  
Consumers often know of the harm brought about by certain industries, but do not 
change their consumption behavior because of it. Many of us have read about the 
extensive practice of slavery in cacao production, or the environmental damage that 
results from feedlot operations. But do we stop buying all but fair-trade chocolate, or 
avoid all pork that does not come from small family farms? I argue that when we know, 
or suspect, that our consumption may contribute to or otherwise result in serious harm, 
we have an obligation to refrain from such consumption. This means that we, as 
consumers, have more responsibilities than most of us ordinarily take. I do not argue that 
we ought to conduct extensive research, but rather, that we should be generally aware 
consumers, and act on the information that is available to us. Those who devote time and 
effort to researching various production practices, and who raise awareness about the 
harm such practices cause, may be praiseworthy for their actions— but we cannot expect 
everyone to do so. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See for example: Office of Public Affairs, “North Carolina Corporate Hog Farm and President Sentenced 
to Pay $1.5 Million for Violating Clean Water Act,” Department of Justice, 13 February 2012, 
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Some consumers, after becoming aware of the harm to which their consumption 
contributes, feel moved to change their consumption behavior. However, most do not 
actually change their behavior because they believe their contribution to be insignificant, 
so that the effort involved with changing their habits seems too much. I argue, with Parfit, 
that it is a serious mistake to disregard contributions to serious harm even when they are 
small. We may not deserve full blame for the collective bad outcome, but we deserve 
some blame and responsibility nonetheless. Moreover, I have argued that we have good 
moral reasons to avoid such consumption regardless of the impact our actions may have, 
as an expression of our discontent with the wrong we cannot prevent. 
 Although a full examination of governments’ responsibilities in these matters is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we can make some modest claims here. Lack of 
information, or access to it, is an obstacle for consumers who try to include moral reasons 
in their consumption decisions. The government has the power and resources required to 
mandate the labeling of products, and can thus make it easier for consumers to find 
relevant information at the point of purchase. It can also enforce ethical standards where 
they have been codified into law. At times, this can be an effective way to ensure ethical 
production behavior- the aforementioned case of the punished North Carolina hog farm 
serves as an example. But we cannot rely on government alone. In 2005, a bill was 
introduced that would have created a “slavery free” label for chocolate products 
independently certified as such. Major chocolate producers lobbied against it, and the bill 
never made it to a Senate vote.48  
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It is possible that individuals have a responsibility to lobby their governments to 
take action on issues about which they are concerned, but no such claim was examined in 
this paper. Instead, we are here concerned with the responsibilities individuals may have 
as consumers when their consumption contributes to harm or other bad outcomes— 
whether or not they should change their consumption behavior itself. As I have argued, 
consumers do indeed have a responsibility to refrain from unethical consumption. 
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